The 
Introduction
The recent results of the studies on interethnic relations in Russia demonstrate that the balance between the social strata that verbalize "disliked" ethnic groups and those which don't is very fragile (Puuronen et al. 2007; Zuev 2007) , the expression of xenophobia and ethnic prejudice has intensified and beliefs of the "non-Russian dominance" in Russia have increased (Gudkov and Dubin 2005: 17-18 This will lead to expansion of the political space for the political actors wishing to capitalize on immigration issue. Therefore it makes a timely research task to distinguish main actors in the extreme-right politics, their coalition and communication strategies.
The developments in the Eastern part of the extreme-right party family have been analyzed in Braun and Scheinberg 1997; Eatwell 2002; Hanley et al. 2008; Minkenberg 2002; Mudde 2005; Ramet, 1999; Szcocs 1998 .
Studies of ultra nationalism have been one of the most prominent trends of political research concerning Russia (Parland 2005: 14-15) , with some scholars analyzing it in the vein of fascist ideology (Shenfiled 2001; Umland 2005 Umland , 2006 . Although, the term "fascist" is becoming obsolete for analytic purposes (Minkenberg 2000) it remains an important discursive element of the political communication in Russia.
The studies of Russian extreme right movement organizations can be divided into two time periods of the movement development. 2 The first "wave" of studies (Hockenos 1993; Likhachev 2002; Mathyl 2002; Sokolov 2004 Sokolov , 2006 Tolz 2003; Williams and Hanson: 1999) (Varga 2008 ). The second group of studies deals with the New extreme-right movement which is different from the historical fascism (old extreme-right with predominantly antisemitic ideology). This group to some country. At the same time, it is only a small percentage of Russians who have access to the Internet, and the digital divide is visible along the age, education, residence and social class variables (Lonkila 2008) . Level of regional development of the Internet in Russia is characterized by a very distinct "centre vs. regions" and "core vs. periphery regions" divides. With the highest level of the Internet users in Moscow and St. Petersburg, two largest groups are the average developed regions (34 regions) and information deserts (25 regions) (Cooper 2006) . The latter are predominantly autonomous republics (AO), where ethnic groups other than Russian make up thу majority of population. In these regions less than 0.9 percent of population is using the Internet 3 (ibid.).
The peculiar feature of the Russian Internet scene is the high rate of blog-users, some of which are the influential Russian nationalist movement intellectuals (eg. www.krylov.livejournal.com4 or www.tor85.livejournal.com). Markku Lonkila (2008) , assessing the potential of future forms of activism in Russia mentions weblog platform LiveJournal as the one which has gained tremendous importance in socio-political debate. In fact, LiveJournal acquired "the aura of intellectual playground" (Gorny 2004: 9), while importance, popularity and influence of some blogs can be even higher than that of the well-maintained web-sites, primarily serving as the source of firsthand information. Unbiased by the mass media frames of interpretation, the blogsphere becomes particularly influential in the political communication when blogs work as the ultimate communication device in the election campaign,
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with the conventional media being under control of the dominating party.
The interrelationship of the Internet and political culture in Russia has been studied by a number of scholars focusing on the use of the websites by the political parties (Semetko and Krasnoboka 2003; March 2004) , civic activism networks (Lonkila 2008) or the complexity of the relations between new medium and Russian government (Alexander 2004 ). Cooper (2006) mentions a rapid diffusion of Internet to politics, and evidence to this is that most of the political parties in Russia have had their own websites. However, in some areas (such as e-commerce) Internet in Russia is underdeveloped, to some extent this can be explained by the distrust of the security and inadequate legislative framework (Cooper 2006 ).
According to the observations made by Belonuchkin and Mihaylovskaya (2002) , the first political organizations which took advantage of the computermediated communication were marginalized, unregistered political organizations representing different ideologies, and extreme-right organizations among them (Pamyat, Russian National Unity). The use of the Internet by the extreme-right groups in Europe and USA has been investigated from the network perspective (Burris et al. 2000; Tateo 2005 ) and the contents of the extreme-right websites (Back 2002; Gerstenfeld et al. 2003) . Surprisingly, the studies of the extreme-right scene in Russia have not Aforementioned studies leave unnoticed the communication style of the extreme-right organizations and intersection of online and offline identity of extreme-right movement organization. However, importance of the research delving into the relations between online and offline forms of activism is high (Lonkila 2008) . The argument of this study is that the visibility and potential communicative success of the political organization (and its selfpresentation), opposing the current political structure is dependent on the effective interplay between its real life action and online resources (webvisibility and networking). This is especially relevant in the context of the country where other popular media channels are not accessible for the opposition or controlled by a single political party.
Illegal Immigration in Russia -the scale of the issue
Labor migration processes in Russia are characterized by a very low level of understanding which is reflected in conceptual confusion (Mukomel 2005) . For instance, considering the fact, that illegal employment is widespread in Russia, and 90% of the undocumented immigrants work, two terms illegal immigration and illegal employment are often used as synonyms.
Illegal employment and the amount of remittances by immigrants are by far the two main arguments in anti-immigrant discourse (Mukomel 2005) .
In addition to the conceptual confusion, the history of tensions of Russia with some of the current labor exporters is also affecting the attitudes towards immigration among the population in Eastern Siberia and Far East, where Ryzhova (2007) 
Extreme-right movement organization and political communication
For the purpose of this study, we shall consider extreme-right movement as "affinity group or cell-like structure in which small, self-forming groups network with other like-minded groups and at times coordinate action and share information, but are not answerable to each other" (Wall 2007: 261) . In our study a social movement organization is a nodal point with a degree of centrality in the network of like-minded groups or activist cells, which establishes an interpretive frame for the issues at hand. The cell-like networking structure of the extreme-right movement asks to consider R.Griffin approach to the contemporary extreme right-wing politics, which distinguishes the party-political and groupuscular organization strains. His concept of groupuscular extreme-right movement is defined through introduction of the concepts "rhizome" and "uncivil society" (Griffin 2003: 35) . Groupuscular organizations have no proclaimed ambitions to become the "nucleus of mass movement, and instead to take the form of a cadre organization run by a small, self-appointed elite of activists for ideological, organizational or subversive ends" (Griffin 2003: 38) . Thus the structure of the extreme right network (both virtual and real) is multi-nodal or "rhizomic", where several organizations may be of central authority for clusters of actors which share some commonalities in ideological framework (eg. anti-systemic, anti-liberal, anti-government).
The first wave of the post-soviet extreme-right organizations worked in isolation from each other and constituted a very loosely connected network.
The computer technology enabled existence of a mesomobilization political (Ellison et al. 2006; Boyer et al. 2006; Miller 1995) With his dramaturgical perspective Goffman intends to describe 'the techniques of impression management employed in a given establishment, the principal problems of impression management in the establishment, and the identity of inter-relationships of the several performance teams which operate in the establishment' (Goffman 1990: 233) . Performance is the key concept in Goffman's approach and refers to the activities which can influence the observers. Goffman distinguishes between information "given"
by the performer and 'given off' which marks the difference between the controlled and unintentional impressions communicated by the actors. In the online environment there are more opportunities for misrepresentation (Ellison et al. 2006: 419) and the space for manipulation is great.
Manipulation is inevitable part of impression management and mind control, which is especially associated with discourse on the issues 'when the recipients lack the specific knowledge that might be used to resist manipulation' (Van Dijk 2006: 362) , such as immigration.
In political communication style of DPNI discursive, cognitive, mobilization and networking dimensions are enmeshed to create an image of movement organization (see table 1 ). Actions of the movement organization can be classified according to their form of technical realization and aimed meaning. 
Dimensions of Political Communication Style

Data
In this study the main techniques for collecting data were qualitative network analysis and analysis of the website's production side, which constitutes a part of the hybrid cultural analysis of websites framework Anti-diaspora argument is also discernible in the National Student Union website, which is associated with DPNI as the youth-student division.
Diaspora becomes a general homogenization term and a label in the hate speech in DPNI official documents. It Is used in the political rhetoric to denote other ethnic groups and attribute the "untitled" and nameless character of these groups. In the excerpt below diaspora is associated with the encroachment on the social order established by Russians, and now being under threat. Such disrespect can not be tolerated and hence, discontent with "tolerance" education programs is justified.
...volunteer-forced tolerantization programs were introduced in many Moscow universities. What is tolerance? ....it is when the representatives of the diaspora set their own rules in the dormitories, and you cannot protest about it and let alone regarding them as "a bad diaspora" and "such people should not be here". (These people study in the Moscow universities) 12
Although DPNI does not advocate direct violence against targeted groups, it provides instructions how a civil person can get a license for firearms. The instructions how to get the firearms are available on the website and in the newspaper "Dozor". The promotion of such civil militarization may be explained in the vein of manipulative strategy aimed at enhancing the public fear and distrust, when everyone has to rely on oneself rather than established law-maintaining institutions, such as police. The arming of the civilians and formation of people's self-defense units for patrolling the cities is proposed as a measure of self-organization for the activists to resist the criminal elements and safeguard DPNI events 13 . The excerpt demonstrates that creation of new "symbols of resistance"constitutes an important part of the symbol-production process.
DPNI
The symbols as "Kondopoga" are "sign-equipment" for generation of cognitive definitions, in line with the movement's goals. Production of symbols helps organization to create resources, which can be easily accessed and presented to the public for arousing discontent and facilitating mobilization.
Kondopoga as the image of a small city, became the symbol of public unrest based on ethnic tensions and is promoted by DPNI as the symbol of ethnic crisis, which may become reality for many other small towns. DPNI links the ethnic tensions in Kondopoga with its anti-establishment stance, persuading the audience to take the assertion, that the governement is illegitimate as it is incapable to protect the citizens. The excerpt gives off the other aim of the organization -discrediting the "party of power", which is hidden within a broader anti-immigration argument. Attempts to discredit the "United Russia"
are also made through production of caricature stickers, T-shirts and imagery, which are targeted for the youth segment of DPNI activists. 
Expressive equipment of DPNI website
In this part of the article the website analysis is intended to identify specific features of the organization, which can qualify as its «expressive equipment» (Goffman 1990 ) used for successful presentation of self.
Important element of the permanent performance visible for the audience is Therefore, when assessing the organization's networking patterns and identifying its allies it is useful to rely both on the hyperlinks structure and offline activities, which reveal the actual communication and "overlapping views of the same reality" (Lonkila, 2008 (Lonkila, : 1145 . The hyperlinks in the case of DPNI expose its authority and reputation in production of the updated and alternative information on immigration issue, with an interpretative frame different from the discourse of the official mass media. However, absence of hyperlinks between the extreme-right organizations and other nationalists cannot be considered as a display of mutual disagreement or enmity.
Conclusion
According to C. Mudde (2005) , in contrast to political parties extremeright organizations present considerable difficulty for assessing their importance and strength. Nevertheless, the potential impact of the non-party organization which stands in opposition to the government can be assessed on the ground of its communication online and offline. Four main dimensions of the political communication style of DPNI (table 1) can be outlined as follows. Firstly, one can distinguish the cognitive dimension, which is realized through production of information on issue of immigration and related topics ('adverse effects') via available communication media (Internet (YouTube).
Secondly, it is discursive dimension, which supposes formation of ideological frames of the immigration issue, where the core animosity dychotomy is of the victims (activists and Russian people) and adversaries (diasporas of "Other" and establishment). In this dimension DPNI's specific emphasis is put on crime committed by "Other" against the ethnic majority. The third dimension concerns the discernible ways of mass mobilization and mobilization of resources. Russian March and other contentious gatherings make up the publicity luggage of the organization, in this aspect demonstrating political elite support is instrumental. Organization can also promote production of "sign-equipment" which can be later used for mobilization (such as "Kondopoga"). Finally, networking dimension, which concerns the organization's website communicative performance in the Internet network. The centrality of the organization in the offline movement network is aided by the centrality of the organization's website online, which both contribute to potential diffusion of the advertised issues and interpretive frames. In the extreme-right movement DPNI fulfills its networking function as a "bridge organization" for potential political training of the young volunteers and their further involvement in the "adult" political organizations (parties).
DPNI is ambitious to present itself as an alternative social order upkeeping entity, but without the wide support of the authorities or the party of power its resources are insufficient. It is hardly a challenger to United Russia nor any mainstream parties, which often employ populist rhetoric (LDPR, CPRF). But challenging the mainstream political actors and competing with them is not the goal of the organization. Political space for the extreme right in Russia is limited «because nationalism informs the ideology of most dominant actors and because historical fascism is largely discredited» (Minkenberg 2002: 362) . Political significance of DPNI is in its function of political incendiary and mobilizer which through available means involves youth -the most uncontrollable political force. Although it does not possess resources which will help to gain mass following it is able to be the visible political actor, which provided due opportunities and chance can become an influential non-party actor by crystallizing and radicalizing immigration issue, which may be later found attractive and adopted by mainstream political actors and organizations. 
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